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A 2006 Comment in The Lancet exposed a “fundamental but
unrecognized flaw in current thinking about cesarean delivery.”1
According to the authors:
Modern obstetrics teaching dictates that a caesarean delivery is either
medically indicated or not—i.e., elective or on demand. [A] grey area
exists that has a larger effect on modern-day obstetrics than most people
think.2
The critique was aimed at dichotomous thinking about the
medical necessity of cesarean surgery, but the same flaw could be
said to apply to the understanding of consent to surgery. Surgeries
are assumed to be either consented or unconsented; indeed there
exists a significant body of medical, bioethical, and legal scholar-
ship on the issue of unconsented, court-ordered cesarean sur-
geries.3 But examining consent to cesarean surgery and the choice
of method of delivery through the lens of reproductive justice4
complicates the picture.
“Choice” and “consent” are concepts that often defy binary
thinking. Just as reproductive justice advocates point out that
“choice” in the context of abortion lacks resonance for many com-
munities because it implies a range of options that do not exist,5
“consent” crumbles where external factors, many driven by finan-
cial concerns, limit the options available to people giving birth.
Constitutional jurisprudence and common law recognize the
fundamental right of all people of sound mind to decide what hap-
1 Robin B. Kalish et al., Decision-Making About Caesarean Delivery, 367 LANCET 883,
883 (2006), available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(06)68359-1/abstract, archived at http://perma.cc/4BUJ-J3U8.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 9 (1987).
4 The term “reproductive justice” was coined by women of color in 1994 to de-
scribe a holistic model for understanding reproductive autonomy, taking into account
the many factors (individual, familial, cultural, societal, economic) that play a role in
whether, when, and how a person births a child, becomes a parent, and cares for their
family. See What is RJ?, SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPROD. JUSTICE COLLECTIVE,
http://sistersong.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141 (last vis-
ited Aug. 28, 2015).  This is distinguished from reproductive rights, which primarily con-
cern the laws that control access to abortion and contraception, and reproductive
health, which primarily concerns the provision of such services. See FORWARD TO-
GETHER, A NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH,
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2005), http://forwardtogether
.org/assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JQX9-PQKC.
5 See, e.g., Andrea Smith, Beyond Pro-Choice Versus Pro-Life: Women of Color and Repro-
ductive Justice, 17 NWSA J. 119 (2005); Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Jus-
tice, 9 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 327 (2013).
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pens to their bodies.6 With this comes a virtually sacrosanct right to
refuse medical intervention, whether or not that decision is medi-
cally reasonable.7 In theory, the right to avoid cesarean surgery is a
“negative”8 right—the right to demand that medical personnel ab-
stain from performing surgery and permit labor to proceed on its
own. Pregnancy does not abridge the Constitutional and common
law right to refuse medical procedures;9 the right, therefore, ap-
plies equally to a person in labor. In reality, however, the enjoy-
ment of this right is impeded by a number of economic,
institutional, and even political factors.
Over the course of the past century, childbirth has been medi-
calized to the point where vaginal delivery, the physiological pro-
cess by which a fetus is expelled from the body, is now treated as a
“procedure” that facilities may decide to offer . . . or not.10 Medical-
ization transforms a fundamental right—the right to forego an in-
vasive surgery—into a request that a medical facility can grant or
deny. And while the denial of the right to decline cesarean surgery
is sometimes accomplished through the use of legal or physical
force, pregnant people who do not have the means to travel long
distances in labor, or who live in places where their only option for
an out-of-hospital birth is an unassisted home delivery, face a form
of passive coercion that works as surely. The use of the iron fist of
the law is rare when health care providers find that the invisible
hand works just as well.
As this article will demonstrate, economic and even political
6 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
must protect, if it protects anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment . . . .”); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)
(“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law.”); see also Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30
(1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with [their] own body.”).
7 Nancy K. Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 118, 122
(1987) (“[T]he whole point of the informed consent doctrine [is that] people should
be able to make their own decisions about surgery, even if their choices are idiosyn-
cratic or even harmful.”).
8 See, e.g., Rebecca A. Spence, Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens
When Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 75, 81
(2012).
9 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the medi-
cal decision of a pregnant patient will control in “virtually all cases”).
10 JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN
MATERNITY CARE 257-62 (2008).
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considerations can impede the exercise of the right to refuse un-
wanted surgery. It will provide an overview of the U.S. maternity
system, the surge in the cesarean rate, and the fluctuating status of
vaginal births after cesarean delivery at hospitals across the coun-
try. It will examine some of the forces that converge to make it
difficult or impossible to avoid surgery, including the commodifica-
tion of healthcare, inequities in the healthcare market, and a
proliferation of claims of fetal rights used to vindicate malpractice
concerns. These forces lead to hospital closures and refusals of
care, economic threats by providers, and even threats of uncon-
sented care intended to drive away prospective patients.
I. DEEPLY SIGNIFICANT, HIGHLY CONTESTED: INTRODUCTION TO
BIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES
Birth occupies a unique position in culture and medicine. It is
a rite of passage of personal and societal significance,11 accompany-
ing the addition of a new family member or the loss of an antici-
pated child. It is a common and normal physiological process,
experienced by approximately 85% of women.12 At the same time,
it is fraught with the potential for danger: any birth can quickly go
from routine to pathological, and birth has been the leading cause
of death of women of childbearing years until relatively recently in
human history. The landscape of birth is not only colored by the
medicalization of childbirth13 and constantly shifting medical rec-
ommendations;14 it is affected by structural factors such as racism,
11 See ROBBIE DAVIS FLOYD, BIRTH AS AN AMERICAN RITE OF PASSAGE (2d ed. 2004).
12 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, Recommendations to Improve Preconception Health and Health Care – United States: A
Report of the CDC/ATSDR Preconception Care Work Group and the Select Panel on Preconcep-
tion Care, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, no. RR-6, Apr. 21, 2006, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5506.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/8FDW-R593.
13 See, e.g., TINA CASSIDY, BIRTH: THE SURPRISING HISTORY OF HOW WE ARE BORN
131-160 (reprint ed. 2006) (describing the advent of a male dominated practice of
obstetrics that supplanted female midwives, and the move from home to “lying in”
hospitals and maternity wards); RANDI HUTTER EPSTEIN, GET ME OUT: A HISTORY OF
CHILDBIRTH FROM THE GARDEN OF EDEN TO THE SPERM BANK (reprint ed. 2010).
14 For instance, recommendations on induction of labor prior to thirty-nine weeks
gestation changed in 2009 in response to evidence-based research and activism by
public health advocacy organizations. See Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 107: Induction of Labor, 114 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, no.
2, Aug. 2009; Don’t Rush Your Baby’s Birth Day, MARCH OF DIMES, http://www
.marchofdimes.org/pregnancy/pregnancy-39weeks.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/MV7T-6ALG; Jane E. Brody, A Campaign to Carry
Pregnancies to Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at D7, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/08/09/health/09brody.html; see also HEIDI MURKOFF & SHARON MAZEL,
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gender-based discrimination, and economic marginalization. In
theory, people seeking medical care and people giving birth have a
larger range of options to choose from for their care than ever
before. Of course, availability of options is constrained by the socio-
economic position of the chooser, and pregnant people are often
treated as less competent or entitled to make decisions about their
own bodies. This becomes particularly clear in decision-making
around method of delivery.
A. Overview of Cesarean Surgery
Cesarean surgery is a medical intervention that has saved
countless maternal and infant lives. But from the beginning it has
been a means if shifting risk between the fetus and the person giv-
ing birth. One theory as to the origin of the name of the surgery—
and there are many—points to a Roman decree (Lex Caesare) in
700 BC that required that fetuses be removed from the womb of
dead or dying women. It is unknown how many fetuses survived in
antiquity, but such surgeries were almost invariably fatal to
women.15
According to medical lore, the first patient to survive a
cesarean section was Mrs. Jacob Nufer, the wife of a Swiss pig
gelder in the 1580s, who suffered an obstructed labor despite the
ministrations of 13 midwives.16 After the kitchen table surgery,
which produced a healthy son, Mrs. Nufer went on to deliver sev-
eral more children, including a set of twins, vaginally.17 The
WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU’RE EXPECTING 68-84 (4th ed. 2008) (warning women to
avoid, among other things, changing a cat litter box, consuming unpasteurized
cheese, sushi or deli meats, gardening without gloves, inhaling when handling house-
hold cleaning products, and ingesting excessive caffeine); cf. EMILY OSTER, EXPECTING
BETTER 122-130 (2013) (describing several common prohibited activities and expo-
sures, including changing cat litter, gardening, hair dye, Bikram yoga, hot baths, and
traveling by airplane, and finding many of these recommendations to be overblown).
15 CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 110.
16 Id. at 103. Interestingly Mr. Nufer was reported to have sought permission from
local authorities before performing the surgery, making this the first cesarean per-
formed under color of law.
17 Id. Some medical historians have dismissed the tale as apocryphal. EPSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 157-58. Scholars question the veracity of the story because of Mrs.
Huber’s reported subsequent birth history, disbelieving “that Nufer’s wife could have
survived the amateur operation and then survive five more vaginal deliveries (includ-
ing a set of twins) without rupturing her uterus.” Id. This birth history, however, mir-
rors that of Laura Pemberton, another woman forced to undergo cesarean under
color of law 500 years later, Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d
1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999), who subsequently delivered several more babies, including a
set of twins, in hiding after two cesareans. BLOCK, supra note 10, at 249; MARSDEN
WAGNER, BORN IN THE USA: HOW A BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST BE FIXED TO PUT
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Nufers’s happy ending was atypical: cesarean surgeries would not
become routinely survivable until the advent of antiseptics in the
twentieth century.18
Cesareans have become much safer,19 as well as more com-
mon: cesarean surgery is the most common operation performed
on American women of reproductive age.20 Nevertheless, this sur-
gery carries its own set of risks21 and “has potential for great harm
when overused.”22 Concerns about the rate of cesarean delivery
have existed for nearly as long as the procedure has been routinely
survivable.
As early as the turn of the twentieth century, enterprising phy-
sicians were suggesting cesarean surgeries as a solution to the sup-
posed frailty of upper-class women.23 They reasoned that wealthy
women, who were prone to “nervous exhaustion,” were too weak to
endure labor pain and were demanding operative deliveries24—an
idea that persists to this day in the media portrayal of wealthy wo-
men who have cesareans as being “too posh to push.”25 Just as time-
less is the skepticism of this perspective, and of the increase in the
cesarean rate it supposedly begets. A 1933 review of maternal mor-
tality in New York City blamed poor maternal and infant outcomes
on physicians who employed the “technically less demanding”
cesarean in cases where “better judgment and greater skill would
permit delivery by the less hazardous normal route.”26 This accusa-
tion that surgeries were being performed for money and conve-
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST 124 (2008); Laura Pemberton, Address at NAPW’s Na-
tional Summit to Ensure the Health and Humanity of Pregnant and Birthing Women
(Jan. 18-21, 2007), available at http://vimeo.com/4895023.
18 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 159.
19 CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 115-16 (noting a cesarean mortality rate of .04%; vagi-
nal deliveries have a morality rate of .01%).
20 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 154.
21 For pregnant women those risks include infection, hemorrhage, thromboembo-
lism, bladder and uterine lacerations, and even death. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 592 (22d ed. 2005). Other nonclinical risks include poor birth
experience, less early contact with babies, intense and prolonged postpartum pain,
poor overall mental health and self-esteem, and poor overall functioning. CAROL
SAKALA & MAUREEN P. CORRY, EVIDENCE-BASED MATERNITY CARE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT
IT CAN ACHIEVE 44 (2008). See also NICETTE JUKELEVICS, UNDERSTANDING THE DANGERS
OF CESAREAN BIRTH 50 (2008).
22 SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 21, at 44.
23 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 160-61; BLOCK, supra note 10, at 122.
24 Id.
25 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 165-66; CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 123-24. Research
does not support the claim that women are demanding cesarean surgeries without
medical indication in significant numbers. THERESA MORRIS, CUT IT OUT: THE C-SEC-
TION EPIDEMIC IN AMERICA 19 (2014).
26 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 162.
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nience would not be out of place today.27 The only difference is
the figures: the “inordinately high” cesarean rate in 1933 was
2.2%.28
The U.S. cesarean rate has hovered around one in three births
for the past few years,29 a rate which significantly exceeds recom-
mendations by the World Health Organization (WHO).30 Accord-
ing to a recent statement by the WHO, “[A]t population level,
caesarean section rates higher than 10% are not associated with
reductions in maternal and newborn mortality rates.”31 A primary
driver of the high rate of cesarean section is the low rate of vaginal
birth after cesarean (VBAC),32 which, as will be explained further
below, is more a function of non-clinical concerns than of the ac-
tual risks of laboring with a scarred uterus.
The health risks of cesarean surgery are mostly borne by the
birthing person,33 and largely deferred into subsequent
pregnancies: with each cesarean, the risk of maternal morbidity in-
creases significantly.34 Medical and public health authorities recog-
nize that use of cesarean delivery without medical indication
should be reduced to the extent possible. Concerns about the po-
tential overuse of cesarean surgery have led the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the Society for
Maternal-Fetal Medicine (SMFM) to issue a joint consensus state-
27 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 50; CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 126; BLOCK, supra note
10, at 42-43; SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 21, at 41 (arguing that increased rates of
cesarean surgery are the result of a belief that the procedure is “efficient and
lucrative”).
28 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 162.
29 Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2013, 64 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Jan.
15, 2015, at 7, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F3S9-8ZM6. The cesarean rate is 32.7% of births, a
slight decrease from 2010-2012. The rate increased every year from 1996 to 2009. Id.
30 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, U.N.  POPULATION FUND, MON-
ITORING EMERGENCY OBSTETRIC CARE: A HANDBOOK 25 (2009); see also SAKALA & CORRY,
supra note 21, at 42 (“Recent analyses substantiate the World Health Organization’s
recommendation that optimal national cesarean rates are in the range of 5 percent to
10 percent of all births and that rates above 15 percent are likely to do more harm
than good.”) (internal citations omitted).
31 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO STATEMENT ON CAESAREAN SECTION RATES, Apr. 10,
2015, at 4, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/161442/1/WHO_
RHR_15.02_eng.pdf?ua=1, archived at http://perma.cc/QQZ2-2XAD.
32 Morris, supra note 25, at 111.
33 See Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Soc’y for Maternal-Fetal Med., Ob-
stetric Care Consensus No. 1: Safe Prevention of the Primary Cesarean Delivery, AM. J. OBSTET-
RICS & GYNECOLOGY, Mar. 2014, at 179, 181 tbl.1.
34 Victoria Nisenblat et al., Maternal Complications Associated with Multiple Cesarean
Deliveries, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 21, 25 (2006); MORRIS, supra note 25, at 120-
21; JUKELEVICS, supra note 21, at 81.
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ment on the importance of reducing the rate of primary cesarean
delivery.35 The medical groups recognize not only the health risks
inherent in a major surgical intervention, but also the impact of
the first surgery on subsequent pregnancies. This impact includes
the increasing difficulty of finding providers who will support pa-
tients in a VBAC, an obstacle largely erected by the providers and
facilities themselves.
B. Overview of VBAC
Although cesarean surgery is a lifesaving procedure, many wo-
men who have had a prior surgical delivery wish to avoid having a
repeat surgery.36 The reasons for this are highly dependent upon
individual and cultural factors. For instance, an individual may
have experienced medical or psychological trauma during a prior
surgery, or may come from a cultural or religious tradition that
values having many children, which raises the possibility of multi-
ple cesareans.37 Even an uncomplicated cesarean delivery entails a
surgical recovery, and most people who have had a prior cesarean
will have at least one other child to care for while recovering from
their birth and tending a newborn.38
The medical recommendations around vaginal birth after
cesarean have changed significantly since the time when cesarean
surgery meant death to a laboring woman. Early in the twentieth
century, physicians were admonished to be judicious in their use of
surgical delivery, because “once a cesarean, always a cesarean”:
once a woman had undergone one surgery, all future pregnancies
35 Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Soc’y for Maternal-Fetal Med., supra
note 33.
36 See generally INTERNATIONAL CESAREAN AWARENESS NETWORK, http:\\ican-online
.org (“The International Cesarean Awareness Network, Inc. (ICAN) is a nonprofit
organization whose mission is to improve maternal-child health by preventing unnec-
essary cesareans through education, providing support for cesarean recovery, and
promoting Vaginal Birth After Cesarean (VBAC).”); EUGENE DECLERCQ ET AL., CHILD-
BIRTH CONNECTION, LISTENING TO MOTHERS II: REPORT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL U.S.
SURVEY OF WOMEN’S CHILDBEARING EXPERIENCES 36 (2006), available at http://www
.childbirthconnection.org/pdfs/LTMII_report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
M5S3-6Z8JDeclercq; BLOCK, supra note 10, at 91-97; EPSTEIN supra note 13, at 162-64;
CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 126-30.
37 CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 108 (describing an increase in incidences of poten-
tially life-threatening post-cesarean placental abnormalities in Mormon women).
38 JUKELEVICS, supra note 21, at 45-50; HENCI GOER, THINKING WOMAN’S GUIDE TO A
BETTER BIRTH (1999); CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 118 (“If all goes as planned, the
mother will be home on Monday, nursing the baby and a sore six-inch scar, willing
herself not to sneeze or laugh, which just adds to the pain.”).
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would have to be delivered surgically.39 This was true for two rea-
sons. First, the maternal indications that necessitated the proce-
dure—such as rickets—were unlikely to resolve between
pregnancies.40 Second, the vertical or “classical” uterine incision
common until the 1970s left a scar that was more susceptible to
tearing open during labor, causing a uterine rupture.41 As surgical
techniques and overall pre-pregnancy health improved, so did wo-
men’s chances of being able to deliver vaginally after cesarean
surgery.
In the early 1980s, the National Institutes of Health and
ACOG each released statements directing physicians to encourage
women to have VBACs—a trend which continued until 1996.42
One physician who trained during this period described great pres-
sure from his residency program to keep a low cesarean rate, not-
ing that the attending physicians were “very aggressive with
VBAC.”43 This shift in favor of VBAC took place against a backdrop
of attempts to curb health care costs, a high-profile clash between
maternity care providers and HMOs that played out in the “drive-
through delivery” debates in the media and in statehouses across
the country when insurers sharply cut back coverage for post-par-
tum hospital stay.44 Health insurers jumped at the liberalized
VBAC recommendations, pushing avoidance of repeat surgery as a
cost-saving measure: a cesarean lengthens the hospital stay and
doubles the cost of a delivery.45 HMOs announced incentives in-
tended to curb unnecessary surgery, such as equalizing the reim-
bursement rate for vaginal and surgical delivery, and paying
physicians bonuses for VBACs.46 Indeed, some health insurers even
stopped covering repeat cesarean sections.47
39 Edwin B. Cragin, Conservatism in Obstetrics, 114 N.Y. MED. J. 1, 3 (1916); CASSIDY,
supra note 13, at 127-28; MORRIS, supra note 25, at 112.
40 CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 128.
41 Id.
42 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 113.
43 Id.
44 David A. Hyman, What Lessons Should We Learn From Drive-Through Deliveries, 107
PEDIATRICS 406 (2001); Joan Beck, ‘Drive-through’ Birth No Bargain For Mother and Child,
CHI. TRIB., June 26, 1996, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1995-06-26/news/
9506260143_1_hospital-stays-mother-and-child-maternity-stays.
45 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 17.
46 Stacey Burling, Insurer Seeks to Cut Back Caesareans, PHILA. INQ., July 24, 1995,
http://articles.philly.com/1995-07-24/living/25678582_1_c-section-rate-c-sections-
caesarean-rate, archived at http://perma.cc/BSM3-DLKC.
47 BLOCK, supra note 10, at 87; Mike Stobbe, C-Sections in U.S. Are at All-Time High,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2005/11/15/AR2005111500945_pf.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZD3N-BL
YE.
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Then, in 1996, the tide turned with the publication in the New
England Journal of Medicine of a study of uterine rupture during tri-
als of labor after cesarean. The study revealed nothing new,48 but
did focus public attention to the risks of VBAC.49 This, coupled
with high-profile malpractice cases involving large jury awards for
uterine rupture (which some note were attributable to inappropri-
ate use of labor-augmenting medications that increase the risk of
rupture50 even with an unscarred uterus51), was enough to push
ACOG to issue more restrictive guidelines.52 In 1999, ACOG issued
a practice guideline recommending that VBAC take place only in
facilities with “immediately available” surgical and anesthesiology
capabilities.53 VBAC rates steadily plunged from a high of 28% in
1996 to 8% in 2006.54
Now, with the benefit of considerably more evidence-based re-
search, and the input of maternity care advocates who emphasized
the desire for VBAC among birthing people during the 2010 Na-
tional Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference on
Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section,55 ACOG’s most recent prac-
tice guidelines direct that VBAC is a reasonable option for most
people who have had one or two low-transverse (horizontal) inci-
sions.56 And, in fact, people who attempt VBAC are successful 60-
80% of the time.57
The practice guidelines acknowledge the limiting effect of the
requirement of “immediately available” surgical capabilities, and
assert that this was not the intent of the recommendation, but nev-
ertheless retain this language. This is tempered by a recognition
that, even among pregnant people who are not optimal candidates
for a trial of labor under the guidelines, “[r]espect for patient au-
tonomy supports the concept that patients should be allowed to
48 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 114.
49 Id.
50 WAGNER, supra note 17, at 28-29; BLOCK, supra note 10, at 89.
51 JJ Zwart et al., Uterine Rupture in the Netherlands: A National Population-Based Cohort
Study, 116 BJOG: AN INT’L J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1069, 1074 (2009).
52 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 115-16.
53 Id.
54 Torri D. Metz et al., How Do Good Candidates for Trial of Labor After Cesarean (TO-
LAC) Who Undergo Elective Repeat Cesarean Differ from Those Who Chose TOLAC?, 208(6)
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 458.c1 (2013).
55 NIH Consensus Development Conference on Vaginal Birth After Cesarean,
Mar. 8-10, Bethesda, MD, http://consensus.nih.gov/2010/vbac.htm.
56 See generally Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin No.
115: Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Delivery, 116 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, no. 2,
Aug. 2010, reaff’d 2013 [hereinafter ACOG Practice Bulletin].
57 Id. at 3.
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accept increased levels of risk.”58
The risk that raises the greatest clinical concern is uterine rup-
ture, a potentially serious condition in which the scar from a prior
surgery breaks open. Uterine rupture occurs in approximately .7%
to .9% of VBAC attempts,59 and requires rapid medical interven-
tion to prevent harm or death to the woman or fetus. Limited re-
search on the rate of uterine rupture after multiple cesareans
exists, but the ACOG practice guidelines suggest that the rate of
uterine rupture in women with two prior surgeries is between .9%
and 1.8%.60
Despite the generally positive prognosis for people without
complications of past or present pregnancies, and despite the re-
turn to cautious endorsement of VBAC, the rates of VBAC remain
low. Calculating a national figure is complicated by states’ use of
birth certificates that capture differing, non-comparable data, but
evidence suggests a VBAC rate near 9.2%.61 Certainly, elective re-
peat cesarean surgeries, with people opting to forego the possible
risks of vaginal delivery and instead assume those of surgery, play
some role in the low rate of VBAC. But there is no evidence to
suggest that 91% of people chose repeat surgery.62 To the contrary,
one survey of postpartum women found that nearly half of the wo-
men surveyed who had had a prior cesarean were interested in the
option of VBAC, but 57% were denied the option, most because of
an unwilling provider (40%) or facility (23%), rather than a
clinical risk factor (20%).63 Of the women who had a repeat
cesarean delivery, 25% reported feeling pressure to do so.64
Even among people who choose to have repeat surgery, the
way risks are presented and whether providers appear to be sup-
portive plays a role in decisions about birth options. One study,
comparing decision-making among good candidates for VBAC who
chose a subsequent cesarean to those who attempted vaginal deliv-
ery found that providers have a strong influence on how women
chose to deliver.65 The authors posited that the rate of repeat
cesarean among the women surveyed could have decreased from
58 Id. at 8.
59 Id. at 2 tbl.1.
60 Id. at 4.
61 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 111.
62 Id. at 137.
63 Declercq et al., supra note 36, at 36; MORRIS, supra note 25, at 137.
64 Id. at 57.
65 Metz et al., supra note 54, at 458.e4-e5.
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70.4% to 25.5% if the providers had expressed support for VBAC.66
Another study of women delivering after a prior cesarean found
that few had accurate information about the likelihood of success-
ful VBAC (13% of the women attempting VBAC and 3% of those
undergoing repeat surgery), and that the women surveyed were ex-
tremely likely to choose repeat surgery if they perceived that that
was their physician’s preference.67 Of women who perceived their
physician to prefer repeat surgery, only 4% attempted a VBAC.68
However one decides to deliver, the decision necessarily takes
into account not only their own health, but also the health of their
baby, their family, and any future children they may wish to bear.
The current rate of cesarean deliveries and the low rate of VBAC
(in spite of the high probability of success) means that the decision
of whether to undergo repeat cesarean surgery or to deliver
vaginally is one that many people will face. It is also a decision that
is increasingly made in a context that is slanted against access to a
variety of options.
II. BEYOND RISKS AND BENEFITS: FORCES IMPACTING AUTONOMY
IN MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING
A number of forces beyond clinical considerations converge to
influence the availability of VBAC. First, the U.S. healthcare system
treats medical attention as a commodity instead of a right. There is
no entitlement to healthcare, which means that some people will
be unable to afford the health care providers who take on the ad-
ded expense of malpractice insurance that covers VBAC. Second,
the marketplace in which people seek prenatal care is not set up
for even exchange between “buyers” and “sellers.” Finally, the prev-
alent discourse in politics and bioethics incorrectly characterizes
the relationship between the birthing person and the fetus as one
of tension and conflict, which provides an opportunity for health
care providers to assert the welfare of the fetus as justification for
depriving people of options for birth.
A. The Best Care for the Highest Bidder: Health Care as a Commodity
International human rights doctrine and many countries
66 Id.
67 Sarah Bernstein et al., Trial of Labor After Previous Cesarean Section Versus Repeat
Cesarean Section: Are Patients Making an Informed Decision?, AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY, Supplement to Jan. 2012, at S21.
68 Id.
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throughout the world recognize health care as a right.69 The imple-
mentation of such a right varies significantly from country to coun-
try, but in the best cases it means that people have access to
comprehensive health care in their communities.
The United States, however, recognizes no such right. There
are limited entitlements to health care for elders and extremely
low-income people through the Medicare and Medicaid programs
and through state-based programs, but health care is generally
treated as a good or service procured through the market econ-
omy. People are only entitled to the health that they can afford,
leading to harsh health disparities that are reflected in maternal
and infant mortality rates.70
The Affordable Care Act has marked an important step for-
ward in ensuring access to healthcare for Americans, particularly
with respect to maternity care.71 Prior to the passage of the Afford-
able Care Act, which includes maternity care among the essential
health benefits that must be provided by Qualified Health Plans
and eliminates exclusions for preexisting conditions, it was extraor-
dinarily difficult for people who were not eligible for Medicaid and
who did not have an employer-sponsored health plan to find af-
fordable insurance that covered maternity care.72 Some women
who had undergone a previous cesarean surgery were unable to
find affordable coverage because their birth history was considered
a “preexisting condition.”73
However, the Affordable Care Act leaves a number of chal-
lenges unaddressed. For instance, one vexing but under-
69 See generally Alicia Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law and Its
Relevance to the United States, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1156 (2005) (noting that 70 coun-
tries include a right to health in their constitution).
70 AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY 19 (2010), http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/deadlydelivery.pdf; Andrea A. Creanga et al., Racial and Ethnic Dis-
parities in Severe Maternal Morbidity: A Multistate Analysis, 2008-2010, 210 AM. J. OBSTET-
RICS & GYNECOLOGY 435.e1, 435.e2 (2014).
71 Jessica Arons, A Supreme Win for Women: The Crucial Benefits of Obamacare, THE
DAILY BEAST, June, 26, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/28/a-
supreme-win-for-women-the-crucial-benefits-of-obamacare.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/6RMG-FC7C; Fact Sheet: Why the Affordable Care Act Matters for Women: Health In-
surance Coverage for Lower- and Moderate-Income Pregnant Women, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WO-
MEN & FAMILIES (Sept. 2014), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/
research-library/health-care/lower-and-moderate-income-pregnant-women.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/WAT6-98MJ.
72 NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., STILL NOWHERE TO TURN: INSURANCE COMPANIES
TREAT WOMEN LIKE A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION, (Oct. 2009), available at http://www
.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stillnowheretoturn.pdf.
73 Denise Grady, After Caesareans, Some See Higher Insurance Cost, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/health/01insure.html.
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researched problem reported by women is the imposition of addi-
tional fees for patients who want to deliver vaginally after cesarean
surgery.  Despite the fact that a vaginal delivery is less expensive
than a surgery, care providers attempt to offset the increased costs
of malpractice insurance that covers VBACs, or time spent being
“immediately available” to a laboring patient, by adding out-of-
pocket fees that can make care unaffordable.
Maternity care, left to private hands in the market economy,
has not thus far trended toward fairness and justice with respect to
reproductive autonomy. The market, it seems, is more sensitive to
some parties’ interests than others.
B. The Myth of the Free Market
The concept of the marketplace assumes a certain parity of
power between the seller and the buyer. By contrast, the provider-
patient relationship is one that is characterized by an asymmetry of
information and power.74 This is especially acute when the patient
is part of a marginalized community (e.g. low-income, undocu-
mented, living in rural area) whose access to alternative health care
providers or facilities is limited, whether by geography or funds.
Directly or indirectly, malpractice concerns play a significant
role in the availability and accessibility of VBAC. After ACOG re-
leased its 1999 recommendation that VBAC take place in hospitals
with “immediately available” resources for emergency surgeries,
physicians and hospitals responded by removing VBAC from the
list of birthing options.75 ACOG practice bulletins are not consid-
ered an official statement of the standard of care, and the practice
bulletin provided no exact definition of immediate availability, but
anxiety about the potential for liability in case of a uterine rupture
in a facility that did not meet the practice bulletin’s guidelines led
to drastic changes in practice among obstetricians.76 As one physi-
cian noted, “The standard of care changed because we do things to
make big jury decision lawsuits less feasible.”77
In a nonsensical example of circular reasoning, this change in
standards that led to such great anxieties about liability was itself
spurred by anxieties about liability. The vice president of Practice
Activities who oversaw the 1999 practice bulletin defended the con-
74 Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary
Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 457-58 (2000).
75 BLOCK, supra note 10, at 87-88; CASSIDY, supra note 13, at 129.
76 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 60.
77 Id.
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servative “immediately available” standard by saying that uterine
rupture almost always results in legal action, and “[d]efendant phy-
sicians are in a better position from a liability perspective if they
were present at the time of the complications.”78 That is, physi-
cian’s should be immediately available not because it is actually
necessary, but so that they can better testify in malpractice suits.
As a result of this change, hospitals across the country decided
that they did not have the resources or staff to meet ACOG’s guide-
lines, with rural areas hit hardest.79 In 2009, the International
Cesarean Awareness Network conducted a groundbreaking survey
of every hospital in the United States with a labor and delivery ser-
vice to assess the accessibility of VBAC.80 Of the 2,877 hospitals sur-
veyed, more than 800 responded that they had a policy of refusing
care to women who did not consent in advance to cesarean section
(“VBAC ban”).81 Nearly 400 had no physician who would attend a
VBAC (“de facto ban”).82 Between the “VBAC bans” and “de facto
bans,” the survey found that 42% of U.S. hospitals deny people giv-
ing birth a meaningful opportunity to decide what happens with
their bodies with respect to a major medical intervention with po-
tentially serious medical consequences and personal significance.83
While malpractice concerns play a role in the availability of
VBAC by changing practice among providers, malpractice insurers
sometimes have a direct hand in curtailing birthing options alto-
gether. For instance, in Oklahoma, the Physicians Liability Insur-
ance Liability Company (PLICO) decided in 2005 that it would no
longer cover physicians who attended VBAC deliveries.84 As the
malpractice insurance carrier for 80% of Oklahoma ob/gyns,
PLICO’s policies have enormous sway in dictating the practice cli-
78 Id. at 129.
79 Id. at 122.
80 Letter from Christa Billings, International Cesarean Awareness President, to the
author, Nov. 29, 2014 (on file with author).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Susan Simpson, Oklahoma Mom Opts for Traditional Birth after C-Sections, NEWSOK,
Sept. 7, 2009, http://newsok.com/oklahoma-mom-opts-for-traditional-birth-after-c-
sections/article/3398916; Mary Ellen Schneider, Medical Malpractice Insurers Address
VBAC Risks, FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS, Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.familypracticenews
.com/specialty-focus/women-s-health/single-article-page/medical-malpractice-insur-
ers-address-vbac-risks/03a0af5782.html; Leigh Woosley, Exit Strategy, TULSA WORLD,
Feb 24, 2005, http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/exit-strategy/article_c34da24e-
7cac-59b2-9fea-64821ebab943.html; Vaginal Birth After Cesarean, TULSA KIDS, Feb. 2010,
http://www.tulsakids.com/February-2010/Vaginal-Birth-After-Cesarean/, archived at
http://perma.cc/RKV6-SJC2.
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mate. Oklahoma physicians who wish to support their clients in
vaginal births after cesarean must either find another insurance
carrier or forego malpractice insurance coverage to do so. Unsur-
prisingly, this is something few are willing to do, leaving pregnant
people in Oklahoma with few options.
The same is true in New Jersey, where sixty obstetricians prac-
ticing at St. Barnabas Medical Center under the MDAdvantage
medical insurer made a verbal agreement to stop attending VBACs
and vaginal twin deliveries.85 The goal of this agreement, explained
the group’s president and liaison Dr. Donald Chervenak, was “to
curb [their] liability.”86
A California obstetrician described a similar solution in her
community, where, in 2002, liability insurance constraints led her
facility to stop “allowing” women to deliver vaginally after cesarean
surgery despite VBAC successes at that facility.87 As a result, accord-
ing to a sadly accurate running joke among local physicians, “the
only way to get a vaginal birth after cesarean delivery is to have the
birth at home.”88 Situations like this not only deprive birthing peo-
ple of important options, they put physicians at odds with the hos-
pitals in which they practice by placing pressure on them,
ironically, to recommend cesarean surgeries even when they are
clinically inadvisable.89
In light of these pressures—on institutions, providers, and
people giving birth—maternity care looks less and less like a good
purchased in an open market in which consumers exercise choice.
The truth is more complicated than implied by one physician-jour-
nalist, who suggests:
[W]omen who can afford to choose their doctor will opt for one
who caters to their wishes. If you want a natural childbirth, go to
a doctor who will give you one. And if you want a C-section, it
just takes a quick Google search to figure out if your doctor has
high rates of surgery.90
As the illustrative examples below will demonstrate, even wo-
men who can afford to choose their doctor may find that there are
85 BLOCK, supra note 10, at 88.
86 Id.
87 Annette E. Fineberg, An Obstetrician’s Lament, 117 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1188, 1188 (2011).
88 Id.
89 Id. (describing a situation in which she counseled a patient who presented to
the hospital in active labor at term to continue with the labor because of her history
of successful VBACs and high BMI which increased her surgical risks; she “spent the
following months defending that recommendation”).
90 EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 166.
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no VBAC-supportive doctors to choose, or that the doctors they
choose may prove to be less supportive than they initially seemed
once pregnancy has progressed to a point where money cannot
solve the problem. Indeed, once the woman is in or near labor, a
political climate that is increasingly hostile to reproductive auton-
omy may be leveraged to enforce the market constraints.
C. The Two-Patient Problem
Since Roe v. Wade articulated a fundamental right to privacy
that includes the right to terminate a pregnancy, the movement to
recriminalize abortion has included attempts to create a separate
legal status for fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses.91 Although vot-
ers in even the most abortion-hostile states have rejected ballot
measures that would amend state constitutions and criminal codes
to redefine legal “persons” to include fertilized eggs,92 these at-
tempts have by and large been successful in inculcating the notion
of the fetus as a subject of the law. Laws related to inheritance,
personal injury, and violent crimes confer the status of “person” to
the unborn.93
One thing is clear: despite the existence of laws that treat the
unborn as persons under limited circumstances, no law in any state
establishes that people lose their constitutional or statutory rights
to medical decision making at any point in pregnancy. Neverthe-
less, laws that recognize rights for embryos and fetuses have been
used as a justification for court-ordered surgery in women who dis-
agree with their medical provider’s recommendations.94 No court-
ordered cesarean surgery has been upheld by an appellate court
since 1981,95 but the threats persist to the present day. More insidi-
91 See generally Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299
(2013) (documenting 413 cases in which pregnant women were deprived of their
liberty through arrest by law enforcement or detention in a hospital, including thirty
cases of forced medical intervention including cesarean surgery, based on arguments
that fetuses should be treated as though they are legally separate persons).
92 See Miss. Initiative 26, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE (2011), available at http://
www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Documents/Definition%20of%20Person-PW%20
Revised.pdf; see also N.D. Measure 1, BALLOTPEDIA.COM (2014), http://ballotpedia
.org/North_Dakota_%22Life_Begins_at_Conception%22_Amendment,_Measure_1_
(2014).
93 See generally Ex parte Ankrom & Kimbrough, 152 So.3d 397 (Ala. 2013) (Parker,
J., concurring specially).
94 See generally Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 91; see also Pemberton v. Tallahassee
Mem. Reg’l Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
95 See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (deny-
ing motion for stay of order on appeal); cf. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-44 (D.C. Ct.
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ously, perhaps, the duty to provide non-negligent care to fetuses
(which exists independently of the physician’s duty to the pregnant
patient in many states), has been used to justify turning women
away from prenatal care, ironically threatening maternal and per-
inatal health.
Treating fetuses as rights-bearing persons miscasts pregnancy
as a struggle between two competing sets of rights. The overwhelm-
ing consensus of bioethicists and legal scholars is that it is ethically
forbidden to infringe upon a pregnant woman’s right to make de-
cisions about the course of her medical care, even when her deci-
sions may pose a risk to fetal health.96 Nevertheless, a “cottage
industry” of bioethical literature on pregnant patients’ right to de-
cline medical advice drives a persistent misconception that their
rights are uniquely contested or subject to balancing against fetal
interests.97 This extreme outlier perspective miscasts conflict be-
tween pregnant patients and their care providers as “maternal-fetal
conflict,” inserts the medical provider as guardians of “fetal inter-
ests,”98 and dangerously proposes that pregnant people have fewer
rights than others.99 This does not reflect the reality of lived exper-
iences of pregnant people, whose medical decisions—even when
they conflict with medical recommendations—virtually always take
into account fetal wellbeing as well as their own needs, those of
their family, and anticipated future pregnancies. The conflict,
then, is not between the mother and the fetus, but between the
mother and the health care provider100 or the state.101
App. 1990) (posthumously vacating an order for a cesarean section that killed both
the pregnant woman and her severely premature newborn); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632
N.E.2d 326, 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to grant a court order for cesarean
surgery because “[a] woman’s competent choice to refuse medical treatment as inva-
sive as a cesarean section during pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances
where the choice may be harmful to her fetus”); Burton v. State, 49 So.3d 263, 265
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (vacating order for forced bed rest on the basis of “funda-
mental constitutional right to refuse medical intervention”). But see Pemberton, 66 F.
Supp. 2d at 1256 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (noting that the court order was not appealed
after being carried out, but relief under § 1983 denied).
96 Oberman, supra note 74, at 452–53.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Frank A. Chervenak et al., The Professional Responsibility Model of Obstetri-
cal Ethics: Avoiding the Perils of Clashing Rights, 205 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
315.e1, 315.e1 (Oct. 2011) (calling the assertion that “there is no circumstance in
which someone could be brought to the operating room against their will” fallacious
“pregnant women’s rights reductionism”); Laurence B. McCullough & Frank A.
Chervenak, A Critical Analysis of the Concept and Discourse of ‘Unborn Child’, 8 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 34, 38 (2008) (“Pregnant women are [ethically] obligated to take reasona-
ble risks to themselves to protect the fetal patient.”).
99 Oberman, supra note 74, at 452–53.
100 Id. at 471
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The “fetus as patient” framework makes pregnant women sus-
ceptible to rights violations by health care providers who wrongly
believe that they have a stronger obligation to the fetus than the
pregnant woman.102 Treating the fetus as an independent patient
permits women to be caught “in proxy wars between those who
place a premium on maternal autonomy rights and those who be-
lieve that fetal interests are more compelling.”103 As one legal
scholar has noted, “the effect of using a two-patient model for
pregnancy is that attention shifts to the fetus,” often to the detri-
ment of the pregnant woman, who, unlike the fetus, unquestiona-
bly possesses rights.104
In cases of disagreement over medical procedures, this some-
times means that instead of abiding by their ethical obligation to
the pregnant patient, physicians cite a duty to the fetus in attempt-
ing to override a patient’s decisions, or abandoning care.105 Fetal
interests, then, become a proxy for physician’s recommendations
and serve as a guise for unethical threats, coercion, and even force.
These are not mere hypothetical situations—they are real situa-
tions faced by people giving birth across the country.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
The failure of the market economy to respond to the needs of
birthing people is evidenced by the difficulties in finding support-
ive prenatal care providers faced by people seeking to deliver
vaginally after cesarean section, and by the passive coercion they
experience from health care facilities that do not support their de-
cisions. This may include threats of outlandish economic penalties.
101 RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COST OF FETAL RIGHTS 6
(2003).
102 Stephen D. Brown, The “Fetus as Patient”: A Critique, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 47, 49
(2008); Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., A Critique of the ‘Fetus as Patient’, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS
42, 43 (2008)
103 Terri-Ann Samuels et al., Obstetricians, Health Attorneys, and Court-Ordered Cesarean
Sections, 17 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 107, 113 (2007).
104 Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of
Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1294 (1992).
105 See, e.g., Defendant’s Attorney Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1-2, Dray v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 500510/2014, 17 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Kings Cnty. 2014) (responding to a motion for summary judgment in a medical
malpractice case by invoking the “controversial” and “thought-provoking” nature of
the question of whether a pregnant patient may be forced to undergo cesarean sur-
gery over her explicit objection, and asserting that “an Obstetrician has a legal obliga-
tion to an unborn, full-term fetus and must ensure its health and safety”—apparently
at the expense of the rights and health of the mother, whose refusal was overridden
and who almost died because of injuries sustained in the surgery).
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Furthermore, stopping short of actually seeking a court-ordered re-
peat cesarean, facilities may use threats of legal process (including
forced surgeries and child welfare interventions) to minimize lia-
bility risk by preventing an “unauthorized” VBAC from transpiring
against hospital policy—that is, making the prospect of delivering
at that facility so frightful that the pregnant person goes elsewhere.
A. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Maternity Service Closures and
VBAC Refusal Policies
As introduced above, the wake of the 1999 ACOG Practice
Bulletin saw a rapid decrease in the number of hospitals providing
care to people seeking VBAC. This is a problem that has become
more troublesome as hospital systems consolidate and shutter la-
bor and delivery units, particularly in rural areas. For instance, a
2015 investigation of the changing maternity care landscape in Ala-
bama found that just twenty-nine of the state’s sixty-seven counties
had any maternity service at all.106 In some cases, women drove
more than two hours in labor to the next closest hospital that of-
fered maternity services.107 Women without the means to travel
long distances for maternity care are left with limited options: “go
to the nearest emergency room to have their babies delivered by an
ER physician, or deliver at home.”108 State law prohibits midwives
and physicians from attending home births, leaving women to de-
liver unattended;109 this is an option that is untenable, especially
for someone laboring with a scarred uterus.
To add to the problem, lack of reliable access to nearby prena-
tal care has driven an increase in the rate of scheduled cesareans,
as well as an increase in inductions,110 which carry a heightened
risk of cesarean section.111 According to Dale Quinney, executive
director of the Alabama Rural Health Association, “Many of those
women are afraid of the distance and elect to go ahead and have a
planned delivery.”112 At Russell Medical Center, which treats wo-
men who live in rural areas without maternity units, 57% of babies
born in 2013 were delivered by cesarean surgery. More than a
106 Anna Claire Vollners, Many Alabama Women Drive 50+ Miles to Delivery Their Babies
as More Hospitals Shutter L&D Departments, AL.COM (Feb. 10, 2015 10:23AM), http://
www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/02/many_alabama_women_drive_50_mi.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/9PCJ-97CK.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See JUKELEVICS, supra note 21, at 139-46.
112 Id.
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dozen Alabama hospitals have cesarean rates of over 40 and even
50%.113
The closing of maternity services raises serious questions of
what becomes of people who have exhausted their options for
VBAC. ACOG emphasizes that even at facilities with policies refus-
ing care to women who do not consent in advance to cesarean sur-
gery, “such a policy cannot be used to force women to have
cesarean delivery or to deny care to women in labor who decline to
have a repeat cesarean delivery.”114 Instead ACOG recommends
“patients should be clearly informed of such potential increase in
risk and management alternatives” and “transfer of care to facilities
supporting [VBAC] should be used rather than coercion.”115 Sup-
portive facilities, of course, are becoming increasingly rare.
Even hospitals that have been VBAC-supportive in the past
may change their policies without warning, leaving women hoping
to deliver at that hospital with no option but to travel hundreds of
miles to the next provider. Joy Szabo, a Page, Arizona mother who
felt the effect of a sudden change in VBAC policy, made national
news in September of 2009 when she protested her local hospital’s
turnabout.116 She spoke to the Lake Powell Chronicle, defiantly posed
holding her seven-months-pregnant belly next to a minivan with a
message scrawled in paint on the rear windshield: “Page Hospital,
enter my body without permission . . . . Sounds like Rape to me.”117
Szabo was pregnant with her fourth child, planning to deliver at
Page Hospital, the local hospital where she had delivered three
times before.118 Ms. Szabo anticipated a VBAC delivery, and was a
good candidate having delivered her first and third children
vaginally.119 Page Hospital, however, changed its stance on VBAC
midway through Ms. Szabo’s pregnancy, claiming that it did not
have the resources to respond to an emergency.120 Faced with the
possibility that she would have to travel 350 miles to Phoenix for a
113 Anna Claire Vollers, Which Alabama Hospitals Have the Highest, Lowest C-Section
Rates?, AL.COM (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/
01/alabama_hospitals_with_highest.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B953-K84V.
114 ACOG Practice Bulletin, supra note 56, at 8.
115 Id.
116 Mary Forney, Hospital Policy Pains Expectant Mom, LAKE POWELL CHRON., Sept. 30,
2009, http://www.lakepowellchronicle.com/v2_news_articles.php?heading=0&story_
id=1849&page=77, archived at http://perma.cc/V887-DXC3.
117 Id.; Elizabeth Cohen, Mom Won’t Be Forced to Have C-Section, CNN (Oct. 15, 2009,
9:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/10/15/hospitals.ban.vbacs/,
archived at http://perma.cc/8DV6-FG8V.
118 Forney, supra note 116.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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VBAC or have an unassisted birth at home, Szabo asked the hospi-
tal Chief Executive Officer, Sandy Haryasz, what would happen if
she presented to the hospital in labor and refused the surgery.121
Haryasz responded that the hospital would obtain a court order.122
In the end, Szabo and her husband relocated to Phoenix, where
she easily delivered a healthy baby boy in December of 2009.123
B. Holding Your Uterus for Ransom: Economic Threats
Mrs. Doe124 lives in Marquette, a small town in the Upper Pe-
ninsula of Michigan. According to her husband, she began her pre-
natal care with Ob/Gyn Associates of Marquette, the only local ob/
gyn practice, with the expectation that she would have a VBAC de-
livery at the nearby community hospital, Marquette General Hospi-
tal. The ob/gyn group was unsupportive of her plan to have a
vaginal birth after cesarean, dropping her from care in a letter that
stated that they would not treat her, even in an emergency. She
received this letter at thirty-six weeks gestation, the cusp of full-
term.
Earlier in her pregnancy, the practice had referred her to a
Maternal-Fetal Medicine (MFM) specialist, who had a monthly
clinic in Marquette but was based in Grand Rapids, 400 miles away.
The family reported that that MFM specialist made only a cursory
review of her operative report and told Mrs. Doe that she was
obliged to deliver surgically because of the risks of cephalopelvic
disproportion (a baby too big for the mother’s pelvis) and gesta-
tional diabetes. None of these predictions were supported by the
full medical record, or ever materialized. Her options dwindling,
Mrs. Doe sought care from a local Family Physician. When that
physician received her file, it included a letter from the MFM spe-
cialist detailing his opinion, which was marked with a note from a
physician at Ob/Gyn Associates stating, “FYI. We are NOT allowing
a VBAC on this [patient].”
Fortunately, Mrs. Doe was able to find a provider in Ann Ar-
bor, and the family made plans to relocate 440 miles away for the
final weeks of the pregnancy. The only thing that remained was to
plan for the unexpected—a potential premature delivery, a mater-
121 Cohen, supra note 117.
122 Id.
123 Elizabeth Cohen, Mom Fights, Gets the Delivery She Wants, CNN (Dec. 17, 2009,
9:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/12/17/birth.plan.tips/, archived at
http://perma.cc/X3F6-6E3Q.
124 Name withheld at the request of the family.
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nal or fetal indication for early delivery—anything that would
mean delivery before thirty-nine weeks gestation.
When Mrs. and Mr. Doe attempted to resolve the issue with
the hospital, Marquette General Hospital’s risk manager informed
the family that MGH would not require the ob/gyn practice to as-
sist Mrs. Doe, even in an emergency. They stated that if Mrs. Doe
came to MGH in labor, regardless of how far she had progressed in
her labor, they would stabilize and transfer her by airplane to the
University of Michigan Health System, in Ann Arbor. When Mr.
Doe protested, the risk manager demanded his credit card number
for the purpose of billing them for plane fuel in advance. Fortu-
nately Mrs. and Mr. Doe had a much more productive meeting
with MGH’s Chief Medical Officer, who rescinded the demand for
plane fuel funds. The family relocated to Ann Arbor at about
thirty-seven weeks gestation, and Mrs. Doe had a rapid vaginal de-
livery of a healthy baby.
Threatening patients with out-of-pocket expenses for transfers
is just one way hospitals may attempt to circumvent their responsi-
bilities to patients under federal law by keeping them from becom-
ing patients in the first place. To understand why a hospital would
want to ward off a patient, it is important to understand the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Management Act (EM-
TALA). EMTALA mandates that anyone who presents in active
labor to the emergency department of a hospital that receives
Medicaid funds must be examined and stabilized.125 Once a labor
is fully active, stabilization entails the delivery of the newborn and
the placenta. If an emergency beyond the hospital’s capacity arises,
they may initiate a transfer to a suitable facility. While ACOG’s
practice guidelines recommend that VBAC labors be carefully
monitored and take place in facilities where the resources neces-
sary for emergency cesarean surgery are “immediately available,” a
VBAC labor is not an emergency per se that would warrant auto-
matic transfer to another facility (in fact, it stands to reason that
hospitals that are not equipped to handle a VBAC are not
equipped to handle any birth, which may require surgical interven-
tion at a moment’s notice). The request for money for plane fuel
from the Doe family was likely not based on any standard hospital
practice, but was instead intended to deter the family from coming
to MGH in labor, triggering responsibilities on the part of the hos-
pital under EMTALA.
125 Examination and Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions and Women in
Labor, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2011).
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Economic threats from health care providers can arise during
labor and delivery as well. Many women in labor faced with an un-
supportive provider try to seek respite (or optimize their chances
for a VBAC) by leaving the hospital to allow labor to progress
before returning to deliver. However, a common threat used to in-
duce compliance with medical advice is that health insurance will
not cover a birth if a woman leaves the hospital against medical
advice (AMA).126 This threat has been debunked as a “medical ur-
ban legend” by a study of insurance billing and payment data for
more than 46,000 patients over nine years, which found no denials
of payment due to discharge against medical advice.127 Even so, the
study not only found that the belief that insurance would not cover
charges in the event of an AMA discharge is pervasive among
health care providers, it is memorialized in AMA discharge forms,
some of which require the patient to agree that they will accept
responsibility for the entire bill.128 As a result, the threat is given
the air of truth and coercive force.
C. The Medically Unnecessary Vagina: Health Insurance Denials
Economic threats are not always as direct as being asked to pay
for plane fuel, but, as discussed above, may come in the form of
having to the sticker price of birth out of pocket. Birth is extremely
expensive.129 In 2011, the average facility costs alone (excluding
newborn care fees and provider fees for midwives, physicians, anes-
thesiologists, and pediatricians) ranged from $10,657 to $23,923,
depending upon whether the delivery was vaginal or surgical, and
whether there were complications.130 Even at the lower end of the
spectrum, these are not costs that people can ordinarily pay out-of-
pocket, so most rely on health insurance to cover maternity care.
As a result, people’s decisions about location of birth or prenatal
care provider are driven by what insurance will or will not cover.
126 Cf. Gabrielle R. Schaefer et al., Financial Responsibility of Hospitalized Patients Who
Left Against Medical Advice: Medical Urban Legend?, 27 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 825 (2012)
(exploring the veracity of nonpayment threats in the general population of hospital-
ized patients).
127 Id. at 829.
128 Id. at 828.
129 See generally Maureen P. Corry et al., The Cost of Having a Baby in the United States,
TRUVEN HEALTH ANALYTICS (2013), available at http://transform.childbirthconnection
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Cost-of-Having-a-Baby1.pdf.
130 Average Facility Labor and Birth Charge By Site and Method of Birth, United States
2009-2011, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION (2013), available at http://transform.childbirth
connection.org/resources/datacenter/chargeschart/, archived at http://perma.cc/
M48C-KHQY.
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Where insurance dictates where a person may deliver, it can have
the effect of making a vaginal birth after cesarean unaffordable.
In January of 2014, Michelle131 was hoping to have a vaginal
birth after cesarean at a hospital just a block from her house in
Santa Barbara, California. The hospital seemed well suited to her
needs, advertising a state of the art perinatal center with an onsite
NICU. Based on the information provided by the medical group
Michelle’s insurance provider contracted with and the shared deci-
sion-making quiz on their website, she was a good candidate for
VBAC. In fact, the desire for a VBAC delivery was a factor in
Michelle’s decision to purchase her insurance policy.
During the third trimester of her pregnancy, however, it be-
came clear that there was no physician who would actually attend a
VBAC at the well-equipped local hospital. Michelle contacted her
insurance company and requested that they cover maternity care
with another provider, and her request was submitted for review to
the medical group. Their response was astonishing:
The service request is being denied because there is a lack of
medical necessity . . . . We cannot approve your request for an
evaluation for vaginal birth after cesarean (VBAC) . . . . Our
physician reviewer has determined that your delivery could be
safely rendered by cesarean section . . . .
Michelle appealed the medical group’s decision and was re-
fused several more times. She spent the last months of her preg-
nancy arguing with the medical group, the insurance company,
and even her husband, who did not understand why she didn’t just
give up and agree to surgery. Finally, with less than a month re-
maining in her pregnancy, she found a supportive ob/gyn who
helped her appeal to the insurance company. The medical group
admitted to the insurance company that they would not provide a
non-surgical option for delivery, so the insurance company ap-
proved a transfer of care to an ob/gyn practice at UCLA, 100 miles
away.
An upshot of a commodified healthcare system where surgical
and vaginal delivery are treated as coequal widgets is that Michelle
is neither the first nor last person to be told that her vagina is med-
ically unnecessary to the birthing process. Even where the determi-
nation is overturned on appeal, the initial denial can cause delays
in care and uncertainty as to whether the patient’s wish to avoid
unnecessary surgery will be respected.
131 Name withheld.
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D. Defensive Medicine Goes On The Offense: Threats And Intimidation
On July 10, 2014, a letter was delivered to Jennifer Goodall’s
home. Jennifer was thirty-seven weeks pregnant with her fourth
child, whom she hoped to deliver vaginally after three cesareans.
She had explained to the ob/gyns at Comprehensive Women’s
Health Care that she wished to avoid surgery if possible, because
prior surgeries had been complicated, traumatic, and required a
lengthy recovery process. The physicians had been resistant, but
nothing prepared her for the contents of the letter. It read:
After consideration by our Ethics Committee, we wish to advise
you of the following actions:
1. We will contact the Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices about your refusal to undergo a Cesarean section and
other care and treatment recommended by your physicians
and the high risks your refusals have on your life and health,
as well as the life and health of your unborn child.
2. We will begin a process for an Expedited Judicial Interven-
tion Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures. This is a
proceeding for expedited judicial intervention concerning
medical treatment procedures relating to the delivery of your
child.
3. If you present to our hospital in labor, and your physician
deems it clinically necessary, a Cesarean section will be per-
formed with or without your consent.
In summary, while we recognize that you have the right to con-
sent to a Cesarean section, you have elected to refuse this proce-
dure despite the advice of your treating physicians. This
decision places both you and your unborn child at risk for death
or serious injury. We will act in the best interests of you, your
family, and your unborn child. Our decision to take this course
of action has been the result of multiple conversations with phy-
sicians and other experts within our organization.
We encourage you to find a physician who will agree to your
demand. We sincerely hope that you will trust your physicians
and our staff to do the right thing for you, your unborn child,
and family.132
The letter was signed by the hospital’s Chief Financial Officer.
The threats to her fundamental rights to physical integrity and
custody of her children were both serious and terrifying to Ms.
Goodall. In threatening to call the Department of Child and Fam-
132 Declaration of Jennifer Goodall at 9-10, Goodall v. Comprehensive Women’s
Health, No. 2:14-cv-399-FtM-38CM, 2014 WL 3587290 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014), ECF
No. 6.
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ily Services and perform a surgery “with or without her consent,”
the hospital essentially memorialized its intent to commit a battery
and misuse child protective authorities by invoking them where
they have no jurisdiction to supervise women’s decisions about
birth, both of which are torts. Ms. Goodall, who had hoped to de-
liver at the Bayfront Health Port Charlotte Hospital now found her-
self at full term in pregnancy and “fired” by her practice. Any hope
that she had of availing herself of her rights under EMTALA by
presenting to the hospital in active labor evaporated as the hospital
had threatened her with a court order or unconsented surgery.
Like anyone threatened with a battery would, Ms. Goodall
filed for a restraining order against the hospital and physicians that
would prevent them from carrying out the threats. Federal District
Judge John E. Steele denied the request, stating in part that Ms.
Goodall had no “right to compel a physician or medical facility to
perform a medical procedure in the manner she wishes against
their best medical judgment.”133 Perversely, Ms. Goodall was cast as
attempting to compel a medical procedure when she was trying to
avoid a compelled surgery. She was free, the court reasoned, to
find another provider who would support her in her desire to
avoid surgery—even though no such provider existed in her area.
After her request for a restraining order was denied, Ms.
Goodall went into hiding. Rather than presenting to a hospital for
medical supervision as she wanted, she labored at home until it was
no longer bearable and went to another local hospital where she
underwent cesarean surgery. As had always been her plan, she con-
sented to surgery when it became apparent that her labor was not
progressing. Even so, the fear and uncertainty and risk to her preg-
nancy that she had to endure because of the hospital’s threats di-
minish the happy ending. Ms. Goodall may have had a healthy
baby, but Bayfront Health Port Charlotte Hospital learned that
they may avoid accepting VBAC patients by threatening them with
force and legal coercion.
Ms. Goodall is not the only woman, or even the only woman in
Florida, to face threats of court-ordered surgery and wrongful re-
porting to child protective authorities because of a medical choice
that is not within the standard of care.134 This framing, offered by
133 Goodall v. Comprehensive Women’s Health, No. 2:14-cv-399-FtM-38CM, 2014
WL 3587290, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014).
134 Letitia Stein, USF Obstetrician Threatens to Call Police if Patient Doesn’t Report for C-
section, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/usf-
obstetrician-threatens-to-call-police-if-patient-doesnt-report-for/2107387, archived at
http://perma.cc/C3GX-RRDZ; see also Burton v. State, 49 So.3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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health care providers and facilities, is illuminating. First of all, the
standard of care is not binding upon the pregnant person, who has
a right to make even unreasonable medical decisions.135 Second, it
exposes the underlying medicolegal concerns. In fact, hospitals
that have sought court orders against their patients have openly
acknowledged the fear of malpractice liability as a factor in decid-
ing to override a competent patient’s wishes, even where none of
the physicians actually wants to perform surgery against their pa-
tients’ will.136 Ironically, this is a concern that has been directly ad-
dressed by the Florida Supreme Court, which has explicitly held
that “patients do not lose their right to make decisions affecting
their lives simply by entering a health care facility . . . a health care
provider’s function is to provide medical treatment in accordance
with the patient’s wishes and best interests, not as a “substitute par-
ent” supervening the wishes of a competent adult.”137 That court
further recognized that court orders are used by hospitals “to de-
termine their rights and obligations to avoid liability” and asserted
that health care providers are not liable in tort for following in
good faith a competent patient’s informed refusal of care.138
While the order in Ms. Goodall’s case does not represent pre-
cedent in any jurisdiction, it reveals a dim prognosis for the right
to avoid unwanted surgery. Whereas health care facilities can hale
a woman to court to adjudicate their liability in advance, courts
have signaled that women, by contrast, may not. The significance
of this is that a pregnant person wishing to deliver vaginally after
cesarean surgery can expect no guarantee of bodily autonomy.
Their only hope for vindication is in the hearing on a court order
for surgery which—assuming that they are represented and the or-
der is not granted ex parte—is procedurally deficient per se.139
App. 2010); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem. Reg’l Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla.
1999).
135 1 Health L. Prac. Guide §11:7 (2014).
136 ROTH, supra note 101, at 118-19.
137 In re Dubreuil, 629 So.2d 819, 823 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1993).
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1248 (noting that such proceedings would ordi-
narily arise under circumstances that would make it difficult or impossible to commu-
nicate with counsel or to conduct pre-trial discovery “to which she would be entitled
as a matter of course in any controversy over even a modest amount of money”);
Gallagher, supra note 3, at 49 (“The procedural shortcomings rampant in these cases
are not mere technical deficiencies. They undermine the authority of the decisions
themselves, posing serious questions as to whether judges can, in the absence of genu-
ine notice, adequate representation, explicit standards of proof, and right of appeal,
realistically frame principled and useful legal responses to the dilemmas with which
they are being confronted.”).
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Where these coercive threats of abandonment are successful, pa-
tients have no realistic opportunity to find alternative care, and no
cause of action in tort unless a medical catastrophe occurs as a
result.140
IV. FINDING SOLUTIONS
The limited entitlement to health in America and the reality
of healthcare in the market economy create challenges that defy
easy solutions—particularly litigation-based solutions. There are,
however, some potential avenues for changemaking. Advocates for
gender equity and reproductive justice can use these strategies to
ensure that, at minimum, pregnant people have a meaningful right
to decide whether or not they will undergo major surgery. Litiga-
tion opportunities may be limited, but attorneys can support these
efforts with their understanding of contracts, administrative au-
thority, and health policy.
A. Market-based Solutions
Given that private corporations will continue to control health
insurance and healthcare for the foreseeable future, these corpora-
tions should be held to account for the service they provide (or fail
to provide) to consumers. Most hospitals have some form of inter-
nal quality control mechanism that permits patients to register
complaints about poor care. Consumer groups should advocate
with local health care facilities to change VBAC refusal policies,
and develop mechanisms for accountability for threats or other in-
appropriate actions.
The prospect of consumer complaints to healthcare facilities
must be tempered with a dose of reality: complaints often must be
addressed to the very institution that has created the problem, and
institutional inertia and indifference toward individuals cannot be
underestimated. Nevertheless, complaints paired with public pres-
sure may be effective in ensuring that patients have a seat at the
table when hospital policies are created. For instance, activists in
Cape Coral, Florida were included in the creation of the Lee Me-
morial Health System’s VBAC policies,141 and maternity care advo-
cates successfully lobbied for the reopening of a maternity service
in the Bronx that had a history of using midwives to achieve a low
140 1 Health L. Prac. Guide §11:7 (2014).
141 Frank Gluck, Mothers Hoping To Avoid C-Sections Often Can’t Find Doctors, NEWS-
PRESS.COM, July 28, 2014, http://www.news-press.com/story/life/wellness/2014/07/
27/mothers-hoping-avoid-c-sections-often-find-willing-doctors/13227725/.
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cesarean rate and high rate of VBAC success.142
Patients may also file complaints with the nonprofit bodies
that provide accreditation to health care facilities. These include
the Joint Commission, which oversees hospitals,143 and the Com-
mission for the Accreditation of Birth Centers, which oversees
birthing centers.144
Additionally, health insurers may be able to provide some re-
lief. Refusal of care by a practice or provider to people seeking to
avoid primary or repeat cesarean delivery may constitute a breach
of the contract the provider has with the health insurer. In many
situations, complaints and appeals of denials have led to insurers
easing restrictions that impede access to VBAC. Many maternity pa-
tients are unaware that they can appeal insurance denials, or that
they may in some instances be entitled to out-of-network coverage
of a provider who will provide the care that they need when there
are no others available in-network.
B. Administrative Solutions
Medicine is a self-regulating profession, which means that
each state has a regulatory agency that oversees the profession ac-
cording to administrative rules and regulations. The creation of
rules and regulations generally provides more of an opportunity
for input by the public than lawmaking, making this an area where
activists can create positive change. One example of such change
from collective effort took place in Arizona, where midwives and
midwifery advocates won an expansion of home birth services to
include VBACs by pushing for a change in the rules governing mid-
wifery practice.145
Regulations can also provide avenues for redress, such as viola-
142 Ben Kochman, Baby step! First Infant Born at North Central Bronx Hospital’s New
Maternity Ward, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/bronx/infant-born-north-central-bronx-hospital-new-maternity-ward-article-
1.1989399, archived at http://perma.cc/8JTZ-WU7X (“The birthing center reopened
with a new post-anesthesia care unit, upgraded security and a core team of exper-
ienced physicians and licensed midwives after public outcry and a $2 million
infusion.”).
143 Report a Patient Safety Event, THE JOINT COMM’N, http://www.jointcommission
.org/report_a_complaint.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma
.cc/BD5E-G6LT.
144 How to Report a Complaint About a Birth Center, THE COMM’N FOR THE ACCREDITA-
TION OF BIRTH CTRS., https://www.birthcenteraccreditation.org/find-accredited-birth-
centers/how-to-report-a-complaint-about-a-birth-center/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2015),
archived at https://perma.cc/PAV6-74LV.
145 Rachel Leingang, Midwives’ Role Expands, To Some Controversy, Under New Rules,
CRONKITE NEWS, May 2, 2014, http://cronkitenewsonline.com/2014/05/role-of-
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tions of EMTALA, which are reportable to regional offices of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.146 Additionally, the
authority of agencies governing the practice of medicine includes
the determination and disciplining of misconduct, usually through
the Board of Medicine, Board of Nursing, or Board of Midwifery,
depending upon the state. Advocates can help ensure that filing of
complaints against individual providers is accessible and straight-
forward. They can also  help develop administrative guidelines that
include penalties for patient abandonment that do not excuse
abandoning patients who disagree with medical recommendations
late in pregnancy.
C. Policy Solutions
The Affordable Care Act has provided an opportunity for ad-
vocates to shape healthcare policy to meet people’s needs during
pregnancy and delivery. For instance, not only must all plans cover
maternity care, many states have expanded coverage for midwifery
services and free-standing birth centers.147 Federal and state insur-
ance laws should require that insurance cover VBAC and provide
out-of-network exceptions when no in-network providers are
available.
Another strategy, already adopted by New York148 and Massa-
chusetts,149 is the creation of a Maternity Information Act. Mater-
arizonas-midwives-expanding-with-some-controversy-under-new-rules/, archived at
http://perma.cc/8TSG-7KM3.
146 Where to Report EMTALA Violations, PUBLICCITIZEN.ORG, http://www.citizen.org/
hrg/article_redirect.cfm?ID=6147 (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
147 Fact Sheet: Why the Affordable Care Act Matters for Women: Better Care for Pregnant
Women and Mothers, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES (2014), available at http://
www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/health-care/better-care-for-pregnant-
women.pdf.
148 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2803-j(2)(a-m) (2015) (“Each hospital’s informational
leaflet must provide the annual percentage of the following maternity related proce-
dures performed at the hospital: cesarean sections (primary, repeat and total); suc-
cessful vaginal deliveries by women who have had previous cesarean sections;
deliveries by midwives; use of electronic fetal monitoring; use of forceps; breech
births delivered vaginally; use of analgesia; use of anesthesia; induction of labor; aug-
mentation of labor; episiotomies; and whether birthing rooms and rooming-in is avail-
able at the facility.”).
149 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70E (2009) (“Every maternity patient, at the time of
pre-admission, shall receive complete information from an admitting hospital on its
annual rate of primary caesarian sections, annual rate of repeat caesarian sections,
annual rate of total caesarian sections, annual percentage of women who have had a
caesarian section who have had a subsequent successful vaginal birth, annual percent-
age of deliveries in birthing rooms and labor-delivery-recovery or labor-delivery-recov-
ery-postpartum rooms, annual percentage of deliveries by certified nurse-midwives,
annual percentage which were continuously externally monitored only, annual per-
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nity Information Acts require facilities to collect, report, and
provide to all maternity patients data on utilization of interventions
such as episiotomy, forceps, and cesarean surgery. These laws were
passed to ensure that people have the information they need about
healthcare facilities and to address overuse of cesarean surgery and
other procedures.150 This permits women to make informed deci-
sions about birth facilities based on their current practice.
V. CONCLUSION
It is fundamental to the basic premises of dignity and liberty
that each person have the right to choose not to undergo poten-
tially life-threatening surgical invasions, and that no such invasion
take place without their consent. Respect for equality demands that
this right belongs equally to people who can become pregnant and
give birth.
In the context of the millions of births that take place each
year in the United States, few cesarean surgeries (though likely
more than we are aware of) take place over the objection of the
person giving birth. But consent is more than there mere absence
of objection, and choice is meaningless in the absence of
alternatives.
The violence done to a person who is forced to have a surgery
against their will is not limited to that of cutting and scalpels: it
includes the violence done by the invisible hand, and the violence
done by the state for its failure to prevent it. In order to achieve a
world in which people can freely and fully make decisions about
their reproductive lives, our accounting of the surgeries performed
against the will of the person giving birth must include, and our
advocacy for reproductive justice address, the many factors that
conspire to deprive people of the right to refuse.
centage which were continuously internally monitored only, annual percentage which
were monitored both internally and externally, annual percentages utilizing intrave-
nous, inductions, augmentation, forceps, episiotomies, spinals, epidurals and general
anesthesia, and its annual percentage of women breast-feeding upon discharge from
said hospital.”).
150 See LAUREL TUMARKIN ET AL., OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. PUB. ADVOCATE, GIVING BIRTH
IN THE DARK: CITY HOSPITALS STILL FAILING TO PROVIDE MANDATED MATERNITY INFOR-
MATION 7 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/govpub/
moved/pubadvocate/GivingBirthInTheDark12.06.pdf.
